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SELF AND SELF-REGULATION:
RESOLVING THE SRO IDENTITY CRISIS
Onnig H. Dombalagian*
Market-based self-regulatory organizations (SROs) are in the throes of
an identity crisis. Once the physical hub of trading activity, securities
exchanges have become primary nodes in a larger web of electronic
securities trading. Their mantel of regulatory authority, a traditional source
of reputational integrity, is now characterized as a yoke around their necks,
stifling competitive initiatives while embarrassing them in successive
marketplace scandals. Once the voice of the securities industry, SROs are
now accused of advocating no interest more keenly than their own survival.
Faced with these challenges, it is not surprising that many exchanges are
looking for ways to shed their self-regulatory responsibilities and join the
ranks of their erstwhile members as for-profit competitors.
And yet, the apparent crisis of faith in exchange-based regulation has
called into question the broader idea of self regulation. New regulatory
models—such as the one employed by Congress in creating the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—are being devised to
fund and oversee regulation of the securities industry, without being
accountable to it. SROs are taking pains to play down the ties of their
industry personnel with (or distance them altogether from) the industry they
regulate. Industry leaders and associations have even entertained the
possibility of dismantling the current self-regulatory system entirely in
favor of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation.1
With all its shortcomings, however, self-regulation is inherently a
sound—and perhaps somewhat underutilized—means of regulating
securities market conduct. Even if exchange-based regulation has failed,
policymakers should think twice before writing self-regulation out of the
Exchange Act. Despite the extraordinary public attention devoted to stock

* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I would like to thank my fellow panelists,
Professors Roberta Karmel and Eric Pan, for their thoughtful comments on prior drafts of this
article, as well as all of the participants in this Symposium for their insights on the topics
discussed herein. I would also like to thank Samuel Vigil and Christopher Kyle Johnston for their
research assistance. All errors are mine. © 2006 Onnig H. Dombalagian.
1. See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION: WHITE PAPER FOR THE SIA’S
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF DEMUTUALIZATION (Jan. 5, 2000),
available at http://www.sia.com/market_structure/html/sia whitepaperfinal.htm [hereinafter SIA
White Paper]. Among other goals, the SIA (which has since merged with The Bond Market
Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association) called for a unitary
SRO, with industry representation in regulatory oversight and a transparent fee system, which
would serve as the sole source of SRO rulemaking and interpretations, examinations, and
investigations. See Rachel McTague, In Push for Single SRO for Brokers, SIA Enunciates Its
Goals, Principles, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 162 (Jan. 30, 2006).
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exchanges and the NASD, there are many SROs that provide the critical
infrastructure needed to ensure fair and efficient markets while sparing the
SEC and the public the cost of securities oversight. SROs are also best
positioned to debate and promulgate the ethical norms that govern the
industry, as long as such responsibilities are confined to those spheres of
activity where they work best. The presence of multiple SROs with overlapping memberships, if properly coordinated by the SEC to ensure
standardization, can further help ensure fair representation of all industry
groups in regulatory decisionmaking and promote better rulemaking.
I.

SELF-AWARENESS

What does “self-regulation” mean? On a purely etymological level, it
suggests a process by which a person, organization, or group of persons
establishes and enforces rules to govern its, or their own, conduct without
the need for regular outside intervention. This definition, of course, might
well pick up any public company, financial institution, or other business
entity that is required to establish internal controls for regulatory purposes.
In the securities and commodities industries, the term is rooted in the
historic private compacts among exchange members. The basic structure of
self-regulation assumes (and the Exchange Act now requires)2 that brokerdealers would be members of at least one SRO, that members would be
fairly represented in the governance of SROs, and that SROs would
undertake to enforce compliance with their rules by their members.3
The Exchange Act nevertheless has some difficulty articulating what
should qualify as a self-regulatory organization, since the term itself was
defined after the fact to refer to national securities exchanges, registered
securities associations such as the NASD, registered clearing agencies, and
other specialty bodies.4 The source of congressional intent lies in the term
“member,” which includes, in addition to natural persons trading on the
floor of an exchange and their associated brokerage firms, any “broker or
dealer which agrees to be regulated” by an exchange or registered securities
association and with respect to whom the exchange or association
“undertakes to enforce compliance with the provisions of [the Act], the
rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules.”5
Though the two are often analogized, self-regulation must be
differentiated from private ordering in the sense that self-regulatory
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2000).
3. As discussed below, SROs have the additional responsibility of enforcing compliance by
their members and controlling persons with the provisions of the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (2000).
4. Id. § 78c(a)(26). The only statutory self-regulatory organization recognized in section
3(a)(26) of the Exchange Act is the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB); however,
other bodies with self-regulatory powers and duties, such as the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), have been created by the Exchange Act. See id. § 78ccc(a)(1).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.
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organizations operate under Commission oversight, receive limited
immunity from the antitrust laws,6 and must observe specific formalities for
the adoption of new rules, policies, and procedures.7 Private ordering
remains an important component of the regulatory system for securities
markets, particularly in those areas where securities regulators lack the
jurisdiction to regulate their members’ conduct.8 Today, numerous
securities trade associations promulgate “uniform rules” or best practices
for their members, maintain standard agreements for interbroker
transactions, collect statistical information about their members for the
benefit of the public, and perform other market ordering functions.9
6. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); In re Stock Exchs.
Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). Cf. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act establishing a National Recovery Administration to oversee voluntary compliance
with industry codes of competition).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing, 426
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 762 (2006), cert. vacated and granted, 2007
U.S. LEXIS 3020 (March 19, 2007), on the question:
[w]hether, in a private damages action under the antitrust laws . . . , the standard for
implying antitrust immunity is the potential for conflict with the securities laws or . . . a
specific expression of congressional intent to immunize such conduct and a showing
that the SEC has power to compel the specific practices at issue.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing, 2006 WL 616006, at *1
(2006) (No. 05-1157). The registration requirements for self-regulatory organizations and the
statutory delimitation of the scope of their self-regulatory activity may thus remain a critical
prerequisite to antitrust immunity.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), (c) (2000) (establishing procedures for the filing of “any proposed rule
or any proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of [each] self-regulatory
organization”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(c), (d) (2007) (requiring the filing, as a “proposed
rule change,” of any “stated policy, practice, or interpretation” of, or “interpretation of an existing
rule” by, a self-regulatory organization).
8. See, e.g., Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),
http://www.sifma.org/about (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (“[SIFMA] represent[s] more than 650
member firms of all sizes, in all financial markets in the U.S. and around the world.”);
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II, http://www.crmpolicygroup.org (last visited
Mar. 21, 2007) (describing itself as a group of senior officials from major financial institutions
with the “primary purpose of . . . examin[ing] what additional steps should be taken by the private
sector to promote the efficiency, effectiveness and stability of the global financial system”);
Financial Market Lawyers Group (FMLG), http://www.newyorkfed.org/fmlg/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2007) (describing itself as a group sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
comprised of lawyers who “advise[ ] on legal issues relevant to over-the-counter foreign exchange
and other financial markets” and “support foreign exchange and other financial markets trading in
leading worldwide financial institutions”).
9. See, e.g., SIFMA Standard Agreements, http://www.bondmarkets.com/stdagrmnts.asp (last
visited Mar. 21, 2007) (noting the guidelines, procedures and documentation for, inter alia,
offerings of securities by government-sponsored enterprises, trading practices with respect to
repurchase agreements, delivery guidelines and buy-in procedures for mortgage-backed securities,
and standard documentation and supporting legal opinions for global master repurchase
agreements and master securities loan agreements); SIFMA Bond Markets & Prices,
http://www.investinginbonds.com/MarketAtAglance.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (providing
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Such organizations have, however, historically lacked the wherewithal
to monitor for compliance, as well as the legal ability or economic incentive
to discipline non-compliant members: The inability of exchanges and
industry associations to police securities markets effectively prior to the
Crash of 1929—despite their anti-regulatory lobbying efforts—aptly illustrates how private ordering can break down in securities markets.10 As such,
industry norms are most likely enforced, if at all, through provisions in
bilateral agreements between members. A systemic failure of such enforcement mechanisms, however rare, is almost certain to invite Commission
intervention absent the buffering effect of self-regulatory compliance and
disciplinary mechanisms.
The most basic self-regulatory function might be deemed mutual
regulation, or the regulation of transactions among members through rules
that “foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities.”11 This standardization function sets
the rules governing the interaction of public orders, the execution of
transactions, the comparison of trading logs by members, the settlement of
such transactions, and the delivery of securities.12 Rules of mutual
data on municipal, government and corporate bonds; and mortgage and other asset-backed
securities transactions); FMLG FXC Master Agreements, http://www.newyorkfed.org/fmlg/
documentation/master.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (standard documentation that sets forth
common legal terms for foreign exchange and currency option transactions, “including payments
and close-out netting provisions”); International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
Bookstore/Publications, http://www.isdadocs.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) (providing
documentation for over-the-counter derivative transactions and accompanying protocols and user
guides).
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 31–36
(1970) (describing the gap between the “managerial and moral responsibility for the national
securities industry” the Investment Bankers Association had undertaken as a result of its antiregulatory lobbying efforts and its “incommensurate . . . organizational development and . . . fund
of economic intelligence,” its “serious information lag” with respect to the operation of the larger
marketplace, and its reluctance “to coerce either members or clients” to provide full disclosure);
id. at 36–41 (describing stock exchanges’ “reluctan[ce] to enforce standards of disclosure upon
listed companies” and their inability and unwillingness to verify the accuracy of statements made
in listing applications).
11. Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Amending Rule 180 to Require
Member Organizations to Use the Automated Liability Notification System of a Registered
Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 55,132, 72 Fed. Reg. 3896 (Jan. 26, 2007).
12. The centrality of this function is evidenced by the fact that it is coordinated by a single
SRO, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, pursuant to section 17A of the Exchange Act
regarding a national system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q-1 (Supp. II 2002); RULES, BY-LAWS AND ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATE OF THE
DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY, http://www.dtcc.com/CustomerFocus/dtc_rules.pdf. While
exchanges and the NASD retain basic rules for the post-trade clearance and settlement of
transactions, Congress has expressed a preference for uniformity across all markets in this area.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 102 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 333 (“To assure
the development of a modern, nationwide system for the safe and efficient handling of securities
transactions in a manner which best serves the financial community and the investing public, the
Senate bill and the House amendment directed the [Securities and Exchange] Commission to
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regulation might also be deemed to include minimum capital requirements
for broker-dealers who clear securities transactions, since members who
agree to abide by uniform rules of execution and settlement must rely on
each other’s creditworthiness. The discipline or expulsion of noncompliant
members is a clear restraint against trade, but one which is sanctioned as
long as it is conducted under the supervision of the Commission.
A second, equally important self-regulatory function might be deemed
reciprocal regulation, or the development of standards that govern relations
between members and their public customers. While members may not be
financially interested in the terms of their peers’ transactions with the
public, such norms of competition not only enhance the protection of
investors by prohibiting predatory conduct, but also increase the
profitability of being a market intermediary by credibly signaling the higher
standard of care to which SRO members adhere.13 Thus, members will
commit to observe collectively-developed standards regarding business
conduct and practices on the condition that other members do so as well.14
Because such rules may also carry an anti-competitive tinge, even when
they exist for otherwise valid regulatory reasons, some supervision by
regulators or antitrust enforcement authorities is appropriate.
Some aspects of self-regulation may also be characterized as purely
partitive, in the sense that they are driven by the desire to balance the
interests of one class of members (e.g., the managerial class, the specialist
class, the “bulge bracket” firms) against the often conflicting interests of
facilitate the establishment of the system and centralized in the Commission the authority and
responsibility to regulate, coordinate and direct the operations of all persons involved in the
securities handling process.”); S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
179, 184 (“[The Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs] Committee is persuaded that the
present uncoordinated state of affairs with respect to securities processing should not be allowed
to continue. When securities firms must deal with a dozen or more different clearing and
depository systems in their daily securities operations, the result necessarily is excessive cost and
poorer service to investors. A national clearance and settlement system is clearly needed.”).
13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 581–82 (2005). The requirement that all
broker-dealers be members of an SRO, of course, correspondingly deters SROs from raising their
standards to a level that would make entry into continued participation in the broker-dealer
industry unreasonably prohibitive.
14. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (arguing that the “logic of reciprocity” may provide greater incentives to
overcome collective-action problems than conspicuous rewards and punishments). In the context
of broker-dealer regulation, such business conduct and practices comprise, among other things,
rules regarding customer solicitation (e.g., advertising, sales practices, suitability, and know-yourcustomer diligence), personnel (e.g., qualifications, examinations, and supervision), fees (e.g.,
commissions, markup schedules, and terms of credit), and disclosures (e.g., confirmations and
periodic statements). See, e.g., NASD Rule 2000 Series (CCH Jan. 2005).
The model of reciprocity is reflected, when considering the international or supranational
arenas, in agreements among states or regulatory bodies that require a market’s or investment
firm’s home country regulator to apply and enforce minimum standards of regulation as a
condition of permitting such market or firm to provide services in the territory of another member
state or regulatory body. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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another. Rules regarding the affirmative and negative obligations of
exchange specialists, as well as the obligations of market makers, were
adopted for the benefit of public brokers. Because specialists profit from
trading against customer order flow even as they facilitate the execution of
public orders, a regulatory balance must be struck to ensure that the
symbiotic relationship does not become parasitic.15 Similarly, SRO rules
regarding the form and minimum content of clearing arrangements ensure
that the relationship between clearing and correspondent brokers is clearly
defined with respect to all material terms.16 One might view recent rules
governing the automation of exchange trading systems as serving
institutional interests (i.e., earnings from execution fees) at the expense of
member firms with competing electronic trading systems or market making
operations.
Finally, some aspects of self-regulation are not really “self”-regulatory
at all, but merely serve a gatekeeping function.17 For example, SROs adopt
minimum quantitative standards for listed issues to create a reasonable
expectation that such securities will trade in a liquid secondary market.
Qualitative listing standards regarding corporate governance and investor
protection also serve an important reputational goal for the SRO and its
membership, as does the surveillance of markets for manipulative or
deceptive conduct by insiders or other individuals improperly trading on the
basis of material nonpublic information in an issuer’s securities.18 Such
rulemaking is difficult to describe as “self-regulation” to the extent that
issuers are not afforded significant representation in exchange governance
structures.19
15. SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 2, at 64–67, 142–57, 162–71 (1963); see
generally George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications
for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217 (2005) (exploring the role of the specialist and how federal law
regulates them).
16. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 382 (requiring that agreements between NYSE members or member
organizations that relate to the carrying of customer accounts specifically identify and allocate
certain enumerated functions and responsibilities and be submitted to and approved by the
Exchange); NASD Rule 3230 (requiring clearing or carrying agreements entered into by members
to specify the respective functions and responsibilities of each party with respect to certain
enumerated matters).
17. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53–54 (1986) (defining “gatekeeper liability”).
18. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU
L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2001) (describing exchange listing standards developed before the
enactment of the Exchange Act); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top: The Impact of
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1772 (2002) (noting that non-U.S. firms may choose to cross-list their
securities in the United States, in part, based on the reputational value of a U.S. listing and the
“higher likelihood of legal enforcement, the signal of profitable investment opportunities, the
more credible promise of improved disclosure, contractual protections negotiated on entry into the
U.S. market, [and] the enhanced analyst coverage” associated therewith).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 46–56.
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Conferring regulatory authority on SROs for promulgating and
enforcing such standards may, to a degree, be justified on the ground that it
builds upon their commercial interests. As the burdens of federal regulation
grow and listing fees and trading revenues are placed in jeopardy by overregulation, the exchanges’ commercial interest in acting as gatekeeper for
the securities industry becomes far more attenuated. For example, surveillance of manipulative and deceptive conduct by members and their
associated persons and other persons trading through the facilities of the
exchange—while originally intended to curtail certain trading practices by
exchange members and their customers in listed securities20—now fairly
encompasses any manipulative or deceptive conduct under Rule 10b-5 and
requires coordinated enforcement effort by all exchanges and the NASD.21
The taxonomy above illustrates the fundamental benefits and
disadvantages of self-regulation. When the power of self-interest is
harnessed to achieve common benefits, self-regulation (with the
Commission’s well-oiled shotgun behind the door) can be a very effective
and affordable means of regulating the securities markets. Troubles abound,
however, when SROs are asked to take on regulatory obligations that are at
best tangential, and at worst inimical, to their managers’ or members’
interests. In these cases, reliance on self-regulation can be more of a
hindrance than if promulgation or enforcement of rules were undertaken
directly by the SEC or another regulator.
II. SELF-DOUBT
Although the premises of self-regulation have regularly been called into
question, the concept has endured because lawmakers have generally
regarded self-regulation to be a practical and efficient way to outsource the
burdens of regulation to the private sector. Thus, despite the periodic
scandals of exchange governance and member misconduct,22 Congress and
the Commission have reacted to public lapses in confidence by expanding
the scope of self-regulatory responsibility and the Commission’s oversight
over SROs. In the present environment, by contrast, there is a growing lack
of confidence on the part of SROs themselves and their own members in the
axioms of self-regulation. This part discusses four reasons why selfregulation is now under assault: the incremental federalization of selfregulation, the diminishing representation of the securities industry in
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000) (“The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices . . . .”); id. § 78i(a) (prohibiting certain fraudulent
conduct on exchanges).
21. See, e.g., Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700,
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,265–66 (Dec. 8, 2004) (describing the formation of the Intermarket
Surveillance Group and its role in coordinating the enforcement efforts of its SRO members).
22. Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market SelfRegulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS.
LAW. 1347, 1347–49 (2004).
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SROs, the new-found self-interest of market-based SROs, and the difficulty
in extending the concept of self-regulation internationally.
A. THE FEDERALIZATION OF SELF-REGULATION
One of the principal reasons for the decline of self-regulatory
organizations may be the incremental federalization of securities law. While
we think of the Exchange Act as creating a pervasive system of federal
regulation, many elements of securities regulation were governed by rules
of, or heavily influenced by, the eponymous exchanges for a significant part
of the Act’s history. Incremental federalization may have been inevitable—
as it remains the one of the few tools Congress has to address the periodic
scandals that shock the securities marketplace—but each successive tick of
the one-way ratchet has reduced the autonomy of the securities industry,
while increasing the costs and reputational stakes for SROs and their
members.
The most celebrated example of incremental federalization at the
expense of state or SRO regulation is the development of disclosure and
governance standards for public companies.23 For example, the Exchange
Act, as originally enacted, largely limited the application of its periodic
reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider reporting and trading provisions to
exchange-listed firms.24 Thus, exchanges could play a representative role in
negotiating the federal disclosure and governance standards for top-tier
companies that sought national credibility. In 1964, following its Special
Study of Securities Markets,25 the Commission gained the authority to
extend these requirements to all over-the-counter issuers meeting the size

23. See generally Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1993)
(discussing the displacement of state corporate governance norms by federal regulation).
24. Sections 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act extend only to an issuer of a security
registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act (and in the case of section 16, only with
respect to registered classes of equity security). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n, 78p (Supp. II
2002). Certain over-the-counter firms that effected a registered securities offering under the
Securities Act of 1933 were required to include an undertaking to file “such supplementary and
periodic information, documents, and reports as may be required pursuant to section 13” in respect
of securities registered under section 12, but were not required to comply with the corporate
governance provisions of sections 14 and 16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b), 78l(d) (1958); SEC,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 2–7 (1963); Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565 (adding subsection (g) to section 12 and amending section
15(d) of the Exchange Act); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027 (describing the addition of section 12(g) to the Exchange Act
“to provide for registration of securities traded in the over-the-counter market and for disclosure
by issuers thereof comparable to the registration and disclosures required in connection with listed
securities by section 12(b) of that act”); id. at. 3037 (describing the extension of the requirement
under section 15(d) that each registration statement filed under the Securities Act “must contain an
undertaking to comply with the reporting requirements of section 13” to all Securities Act
registrants).
25. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 7–17, 60–64.
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and shareholder requirements of section 12(g).26 Moreover, beginning in the
1970s and continuing to the present day, the Commission transformed the
Exchange Act’s periodic disclosure requirements into a system of forwardlooking disclosure, rather than purely historical data. These developments
considerably expanded the range of information required to be disclosed by
all listed and unlisted companies, while simultaneously diminishing the
scope and prestige of exchange standards.27
Exchanges retain the incentives and discretion to promulgate qualitative
governance rules and standards that are stricter than Commission
requirements as a means of reputationally distinguishing their listed
issues.28 Thus, in addition to the quantitative requirements for listing
eligibility, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has historically imposed
obligations such as real-time disclosure of certain material information
during volatile market conditions, and corporate governance rules
respecting the independence of auditors, directors, and audit committees.29
NYSE listing agreements also continue to provide important protections for
investors in exchange-listed securities by restricting the dilution of their
voting rights in various corporate finance transactions.30
Even in these areas, the Commission and Congress have sought to use
exchange rules to further their regulatory goals. Exchange rulemaking and
enforcement in the area of corporate governance, for example, often appears
to have been prodded by the Commission as a means of circumventing
statutory limitations on its own authority.31 Legislation such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which appears to be the first to mandate specific
listing standards through legislation,32 can only further erode the selfregulatory principle that exchanges autonomously develop standards for
corporate governance.
26. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565; Michael J.
Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 17, 29–30 (1986).
27. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 465–66 (rev. ed.
1995).
28. See Karmel, supra note 18, at 329–30.
29. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 202.03, 303A.00 (2006) [hereinafter NYSE
LCM].
30. Id. § 313.00(A).
31. Karmel, supra note 18, at 352; Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., ABA, Special Study on
Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1490
(2002). Prominent examples are the Commission’s efforts to require the NYSE to enforce its rule
against dual class recapitalizations after its own Exchange Act Rule 19c-4 was vacated in Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to require exchanges to adopt rules
governing auditor independence in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the
Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057 (1999).
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)).
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Standardization of financial responsibility rules for securities
intermediaries, such as net capital, customer protection, and bookkeeping
requirements, has also figured prominently in the downsizing of the SRO’s
special statutory mission.33 While the unique expertise and mutual interest
of exchange members in upholding high standards of financial
responsibility might have militated in favor of keeping these rules largely
within the purview of SRO regulation, the back office crisis and subsequent
insolvencies of several brokerage firms put these rules squarely on the
federalization agenda in the 1960s. Initially, the Congressional reaction
favored a self-regulatory approach to the problem of customer protection:
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 provided a self-regulatory
model for customer protection under the auspices of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation.34 Within five years, however, Congress gave the
Commission the authority to promulgate uniform net capital and customer
protection rules for all registered broker-dealers.35
Today, while exchanges might not impose significant additional net
capital requirements by rule, exchanges such as the NYSE and the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) still play a very important role in the
application and interpretation of the Commission’s rules and work closely
with the Commission and the brokerage industry to adapt to marketplace
developments. Two factors, however, threaten the future of this relationship. First, following the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, banking
regulation can be expected to play a greater, if indirect, role in the standard
setting process for financial responsibility rules.36 Second, with the
33. Section 7(d) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636, 1653, required the Commission to prescribe “safeguards with respect to the financial
responsibility and related practices of brokers and dealers,” and in particular, “the maintenance of
reserves with respect to customers’ deposits or credit balances.” See also Broker-Dealers;
Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224 (Nov. 29, 1972) (adopting the
Commission’s customer protection rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3). Five years later, section 11(3)
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, amended section
15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act to require the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations
establishing minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and dealers. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(3) (2000). See also Adoption of Net Capital Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795, 29,795–96 (July
16, 1975) (revisions to Commission’s net capital rule, pursuant to the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, eliminating the exemption from the Commission’s net capital rule for
members of designated national securities exchanges required to comply with net capital rules of
such exchanges).
34. See infra note 106. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) insures customer
securities and cash balances through a fund maintained by assessments from its membership,
which generally includes all registered broker-dealers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (2000). SIPC has
significant powers to intervene in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings involving its members
and is responsible for the distribution of securities and funds to customers of an insolvent
brokerage firm. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee–78hhh (2000).
35. Steven L. Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers’ Financial Responsibility under
the Uniform Net Capital Rule—A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 14–16 (1983–1984).
36. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), is generally
said to have repealed the long-standing prohibition under the Glass-Steagall Act against the
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internationalization of investment firms, there have been parallel efforts to
regulate financial responsibility on a groupwide basis rather than at the
level of the individual SEC-regulated brokerage firm,37 and to standardize
capital requirements for all firms.38 While SROs attempt to exercise some
oversight over the corporate parents of their members,39 the Commission is
ultimately better positioned to enter into discussions with both domestic and
foreign financial services regulators to harmonize such rules.
SRO business conduct regulation, while still the SROs’ strongest suit,
has also come under assault, particularly as a result of the expansion of
private rights of action under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 and increasing SEC
rulemaking in all aspects of broker-dealers’ customer relations. SRO rules
continue to govern the gray area that does not rise to the level of fraud but
nevertheless falls short of “just and equitable principles of trade.”40 SROs,
such as the NASD, also play a significant compliance role with respect to
newly registered brokerage firms, including screening for disqualifications,
examining for competence, ensuring adequate supervisory personnel, and
overseeing the use of advertising and sales literature. Even here, however,
the Commission has stepped up its own efforts by dedicating compliance
personnel to the oversight of broker-dealer operations.41 The rise of
affiliation of commercial and investment banking. The Act permits bank holding companies that
qualify as “financial holding companies” to provide other financial services—such as
underwriting, brokerage, and insurance—through subsidiaries functionally regulated by the
appropriate federal or state regulatory authority and under the “umbrella” supervision of the
Federal Reserve Board. Id. at pt. [1]. Although the Federal Reserve Board may not generally apply
capital standards to SEC-registered broker-dealer subsidiaries of a financial holding company, or
look to such subsidiaries as a “source of strength” for a bank affiliate, id. § 111(c), the Board has
stated that it “is responsible for assessing consolidated capital adequacy for FHCs with the
ultimate objective of protecting the insured depository subsidiaries from the effects of disruptions
in the nonbank portions of the organization.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
SR Letter, SR 00-13 (SUP) (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/SR LETTERS/2000/SR0013.HTM.
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (Supp. II 2002). This section was enacted as part of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 to provide a framework for Commission supervision of
investment bank holding companies, including recordkeeping and reporting requirements and
examination authority. See also Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, Exchange Act
Release No. 49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004) (adopting final rules creating a new
framework for supervising an investment bank holding company).
38. Cf. States Demand Role in Basel II Plans, New York State Banking Regulator Says, 87
Banking Daily (BNA) No. 10, at 388 (Sept. 18, 2006) (describing state bank regulators’ concerns
that the process by which the Basel II capital accord is being implemented in the United States has
been dominated by federal regulators).
39. NASD Rule 1017, Application for Approval of Change in Ownership, Control or Business
Operation (2006) (requiring NASD approval for change in ownership or control of member
firms); NYSE Rule 304(E), Allied Members and Approved Persons (2006) (requiring Exchange
approval of persons who control a member or member organization).
40. Commission efforts to characterize unethical business practices as fraud must be
predicated on implied representations or non-verbal conduct. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is
the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995) (describing the implied
representations of broker-dealers that they will deal fairly with customers).
41. See infra Part III.A.

328

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

securities arbitration under SRO auspices may also have had the effect, at
least in the context of private litigation, of eroding the boundary between
SRO ethical norms and securities fraud. For example, arbitrators may,
absent “manifest disregard of the law,” inadvertently impose liability for
conduct that falls short of the judicially developed contours of Rule 10b-5.42
Finally, the Commission’s significant rulemaking in the area of market
structure has considerably undermined the autonomy of exchanges to
regulate the structure of their own market operations. The justification for
conferring disciplinary authority on exchanges is their comprehensive
ability to oversee and control participation in trading through their facilities;
the power to exclude subsumes the power to discipline. Once exchanges are
no longer able—or permitted—to mandate consolidation of order flow
through their facilities, the source of self-regulatory authority wanes
considerably. As others have discussed, over the past seventy years the
Commission has cajoled or required the primary exchanges to abandon
mandatory minimum commission schedules, off-board trading prohibitions
(both with respect to other exchanges and the over-the-counter market), and
restrictions on the ability of management or shareholders to delist
companies from an exchange.43
Similarly, centralization of trading under Commission rules governing
the national market system has supplanted the role traditionally played by
exchanges and the NASD in developing priority, parity, and precedence
rules for execution and execution quality and conflict-of-interest standards.
Rules, such as the duty of best execution, order handling and routing
obligations, and the prohibition against trading ahead of customer orders,
are gradually being hardwired into inter-exchange communications systems
built to Commission specifications.44 Experts may disagree as to whether
limiting the discretion of broker-dealers to choose among competing trading
systems is appropriate, but a collateral effect of such initiatives is to
minimize the roles of SROs in promulgating and enforcing “just and
equitable principles of trade.”45
42. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415 (2003–2004).
43. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate to
Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 613, 613–15
(2005); Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory
and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 399, 412–17, 462–63; Karmel, supra note 18, at 347–52.
44. NYSE Sees Best Execution Differently from Amex, Nasdaq, 38 Sec. L. Daily (BNA) No.
30, at 1278 (July 18, 2006). SEC Chief Economist Chester Spatt suggested that “Regulation NMS
to some extent ‘simplifies’ a broker-dealer’s duty of best execution by transferring some of the
responsibility for best execution to the exchanges.” Id. See also Simon & Colby, supra note 26,
at 27–28.
45. Compare Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure as an Independent Variable in Assessing Stock
Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547 (2004), Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake,
Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 J. CORP. L. 443 (2000), and Yakov
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B. THE CHANGING FACE OF SELF-REGULATION
Another development affecting the vitality of SROs is their increasing
bureaucratization. One of the core assumptions of self-regulation is that
SROs will be representative of the industry they regulate. Each national
securities exchange and registered securities association, for example, must
“assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors
and administration of its affairs.”46 The public interest was to be advanced
by requiring “one or more directors” who would be “representative of
issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange,
broker or dealer.”47 Moreover, an expectation existed that organizations
representative of the securities industry would be involved in SRO
governance, disciplinary activity, and day-to-day decisionmaking.48
With the increasing size and specialization of SRO staff, SRO
governance threatens to lose its representative status. Industry representation is largely confined to board oversight and member participation in the
committee structure and disciplinary proceedings at various SROs.49
Internal divisions between regulatory and operational arms further segregate
Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Securities Trading Across
Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411 (1996), with Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From
Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563
(2005), and Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753 (1999). See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C.S §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6), 78o-4(b)(2)(B), 78o-5(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring
national securities exchanges, national securities associations, and registered clearing agencies to
have rules designated to promote “just and equitable principles of trade”).
46. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006).
47. In practice, many exchanges sought to balance the number of “industry” directors on their
boards with a comparable number of “public” (or “non-industry”) directors. The proposed
definition of “independent” directors in the SEC rules appears to be more restrictive than the
traditional “public” or “non-industry” classification under prior exchange rules. See Listing and
Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, Exchange Act Release No.
50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,135 n.101 (reciting requirements of the Boston Stock Exchange’s
Constitution and the former Pacific Exchange’s By-Laws establishing an equal proportion of
“public” or “non-industry” and “industry” directors); NYSE CONST. art. 4, § 2 (CCH May 2002)
(requiring, prior to the governance reforms contained in Exchange Act Release No. 48,946, that
the board of the NYSE include, in addition to senior officers, 12 industry and 12 public directors);
Letter from Neal Wolkoff, Acting CEO, AMEX, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 8,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73904/nwolkoff 030805a.pdf (reflecting
on AMEX’s experience with a “largely independent board composed of many highly respected
and accomplished individuals with no ties to the securities industry”); Letter from Robert Glauber,
Chairman and CEO, NASD, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73904/rrglauber030805.pdf (noting that, pursuant to its
undertakings in connection with the 1996 settlement described in the 21(a) Report, the “NASD
maintains a majority Public and Non-Industry membership on its Board of Governors,” as defined
in its by-laws and rules).
48. S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 4–5 (1938) (describing the Maloney Act as creating a program of
“cooperative regulation . . . [in which the task will be largely performed by] representative
organizations of investment bankers, dealers, and brokers”).
49. Walter Says NASD Committed to Keeping ‘Self’ in Self-Regulation, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1534 (Sept. 14, 2006) (describing member involvement in SRO governance).
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persons involved in regulatory decisions from individuals with operational
experience in the securities industry.50 It has also long been observed that
the need to develop specialized compliance inspection and enforcement
functions within each SRO results in the delegation of responsibility to fulltime paid staffs, who may or may not have managerial or operational
experience in any of the SRO’s member firms.51 While this does not
necessarily imply that familiarity with firm operations cannot be acquired, it
does suggest a lack of identity on the basis of which to establish a claim of
self-representation in self-regulation.
Recent SEC initiatives would increase this trend toward greater
independence from the securities industry. Proposed rules respecting SRO
governance, for example, would require SRO boards to consist of a
majority of independent directors.52 While the preference for outside
directors is nothing new, stringent independence requirements would
generally exclude individuals with any material ties to the securities
industry.53 When combined with the effect of the SEC’s determination to
permit for-profit exchanges (discussed below), member representation on
SRO boards could decline to as little as 20%.54 The SEC’s SRO governance
rules would also mandate greater separation between SROs’ regulatory and
operational functions,55 and require internal controls to ensure regulatory
monies do not subsidize operational activities.56
These developments will have numerous consequences on selfregulation. As SRO personnel begin to look more like the SEC, it will be
increasingly difficult to envision SROs performing the traditional buffering
function between industry competition and SEC regulation. Instead, SROs,
such as the NASD, are likely to behave as if they are an extension of the
Commission’s own compliance and enforcement arms, with the added
benefit that they are subsidized by industry fees and not constrained by the
same statutory limitations on their power. NASD rulemaking initiatives, for
example, may become increasingly driven by pressure from the
Commission, rather than pressure for coordination by the industry.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 68–71.
51. See, e.g., Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Market: A Critical
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 862–63 (1985) (citing William L. Cary, SelfRegulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 247 (1963); SEC, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 602).
52. Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 71,126.
53. See id. (defining “independent director”); see, e.g., Walter Says NASD Committed to
Keeping ‘Self’ in Self-Regulation, supra note 49 (noting that the NASD Board of Governors has 7
industry directors out of 18 and NYSE regulation has no industry representation).
54. See Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 71,126 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-5(c)(5)).
55. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.6a-5(n)(1), 240.15Aa-3(n)(1)).
56. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.6a-5(n)(4), 240.15Aa-3(n)(4)).

2007]

Self and Self-Regulation

331

More importantly, the agenda of self-regulators may retreat
significantly from areas outside of the SEC’s competence or expertise.
Many aspects of today’s securities markets are not subject to direct
regulation by the Commission—such as over-the-counter derivatives
transactions and corporate debt markets. These are areas in which SROs
truly representative of the securities industry might make headway in
spearheading the development of business conduct norms, much as the U.S.
Treasury Department and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)
have developed idiosyncratic rules for the government and municipal
securities markets. The NASD has made only modest forays into such
issues, presumably because the industry has no desire to see Commissiondominated SROs creep into areas outside of the SEC’s direct oversight.
C SELF-INTEREST
Even as recent trends have aligned the interests of SRO regulatory
personnel with those of the SEC, they have created even greater
opportunities for SRO operational personnel to leverage the value of their
special statutory status. Historically, exchanges and other SROs were
operated as not-for-profit organizations. While a limited number of exempt
exchanges were permitted to operate on a for-profit basis outside of the
statutory regime, exchanges largely existed to furnish facilities “for the
convenient transaction of business by its members.”57 Abuses of exchange
management, however frequent, were usually for the benefit of one faction
(e.g., specialists or floor brokers) at the expense of another.58 The
profitability of a seat on the exchange and the access it conferred to its
exclusive information and services, moreover, deterred members from
“turning them into shares” that could be offered to the public.59
Although the Commission has acknowledged that national securities
exchanges could be organized as for-profit entities, several factors
contributed to the current trend to seek for-profit status.60 First, technology
made pure brokerage profitable. New electronic trading systems capitalized
on technological improvements to offer more efficient, if non-traditional,
venues for trade execution without sponsoring the intermediation of a
dealer.61 Virtually all of these systems were permitted to operate as
registered broker-dealers in the United States, rather than as exchanges, in

57. NYSE CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
58. See Seligman, supra note 22, at 1355.
59. Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L. REV. 367, 372–73 (2002). See
also Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2564–
66 (2006).
60. Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,486 (June 4, 1997).
61. See, e.g., Macey & O’Hara, supra note 13 (describing technological advances that affect
trading).
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order to facilitate their proliferation.62 The mutual structure of the primary
exchanges, encumbered as it was by members’ (and in particular,
specialists’) self-interest, prevented the adoption of new execution technologies in favor of traditional intermediated trading. To the extent that
many brokerage firms were investing in competing execution or market
making technologies,63 exchange members increasingly found themselves
in direct competition with their regulators.64
Second, Commission rulemaking requires SROs to build linkage
systems that would serve as the basis for intermarket connectivity. The
Commission had long pressed exchanges and the NASD to develop
technologies to improve execution quality for retail investors by facilitating
access to their members’ published quotations.65 This eventually placed
SROs—particularly, the NASD—in direct competition with members who
operated electronic trading or market making systems, because they were
essentially building systems that would eliminate internalization of orders
in favor of a centralized (if not mandatory) limit order book.66 In particular,
62. Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486. One system, the Arizona Stock
Exchange, has been recognized as an “exchange” operating pursuant to a limited volume
exemption from registration under section 5 of the Exchange Act. See Order Amending
Exemption Order and Granting Amendment to Application for Exemption from Registration as an
Exchange under section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
37,271, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,145 (June 3, 1996). To the extent that a limited-volume business model
forecloses any benefits from economies of scale, it is not surprising that few trading systems have
pursued such regulatory classification.
63. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 817
(2001).
64. See Gaston F. Ceron, Moving the Market: Big Board Sets Expansion In Electronic
Trading, WALL ST. J, Aug. 28, 2006, at C3 (describing concerns of NYSE specialists and brokers
that the lifting of the limits on electronic trading could sideline them and hurt their profits).
65. See Order Granting Temporary Approval, On An Accelerated Basis to a Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Establish the Order
Confirmation Transaction Service Enhancement to the NASDAQ System, Exchange Act Release
No. 25,263, 53 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan 19, 1988) (approving Nasdaq’s SelectNet Service, formerly
the Order Confirmation Transaction Service, on a temporary accelerated basis); National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Release No.
21,743, 50 Fed. Reg. 7432 (Feb. 22, 1985) (approving Nasdaq’s Small Order Execution Service).
See also Simon & Colby, supra note 26, at 73–76.
66. For example, in its application for registration as a freestanding national securities
exchange, Nasdaq agreed to limit “Nasdaq Exchange transactions” to those trades that are
“executed in the Exchange’s systems and to amend its Exchange systems to require executions to
occur pursuant” to price- and (with certain exceptions) time-priority rules. See, e.g., In re Nasdaq
Stock Market, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550, 3550–51 (Jan. 23, 2006).
This amendment obviated the need for the Commission to reconsider whether exchanges must
have a central limit order book that ensures some price/time priority over dealer trades on the
exchange. Id. at 3550–51; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2006) (interpreting the statutory
definition of an “exchange” in section 3 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(1), to require the
use of “established, non-discretionary methods . . . under which . . . orders interact with each
other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade”). It eliminated,
however, the ability of members (such as market makers) to “preference” execution of customer
orders against a designated quoting market participant’s quote, irrespective of time priority, as
long as the quote matched the contemporaneous best bid/best offer. See, e.g., Former NASD Rule
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SROs could offer the unique proposition of disintermediation and
regulatory imprimatur. Why pay a market maker or an alternative trading
system to display your order in Nasdaq when you can display your order
directly in Nasdaq? Why risk a poor execution in an alternative trading
system, when you are guaranteed an execution quality price on the NYSE?
Together with trade-through rules that favor established markets, exchanges
had a competitive edge over their members.67
Third, the Commission’s separation of regulatory and operational
functions within SROs made it possible for SROs to operate their facilities
as profitable subsidiaries. In 1996, following the Nasdaq market making
scandal, the NASD was required, inter alia, to segregate its market
operations (which became the Nasdaq Stock Market) from its regulatory
operations (NASD Regulation).68 Parallel with, if not as a consequence of,
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the governance
reforms following the public debate over NYSE CEO Richard Grasso’s
compensation package, the Commission proposed to extend this structural
segregation to other exchanges.69 The Commission has also proposed to
revamp the rules of exchange governance to require greater transparency
and segregation of the regulatory and trading operations of SROs. And just
as Nasdaq has spun off from the NASD to be a freestanding SRO (having
delegated its self-regulatory responsibility to the NASD), the NYSE has
formally separated its regulatory and business operations into independent
subsidiaries to reduce conflicts of interest.70
With autonomy and the prospect of profitability, electronic trading
could be used not only to improve member access to public quotes, but to
supplant member activity in the over-the-counter markets. Nasdaq could
transform its system for displaying and providing execution access to
member quotations into an electronic trading system that would rival its
competitors in the over-the-counter market. NYSE, AMEX, and the
4710(b)(1)(B)(ii)(b) (CCH Jan. 2005). Thus, a market maker may not preferentially execute
customer transactions against its own quote “on or through” the facilities of the Nasdaq Exchange.
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005) (requiring trading centers to establish, maintain and
enforce policies reasonably designed to prevent transactions on their markets that “trade-through”
the protected quotations of other markets in NMS stocks).
68. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (Aug. 8, 1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nasdaq21a.htm.
69. Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, Exchange
Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,129–30 (describing the proposed governance
reforms adopted by the NYSE in December 2003 in the context of “Governance Concerns”
relating to issuers of exchange-listed securities and to the NYSE itself in connection with its
Chairman’s compensation package, and the concomitant concerns over weaknesses in the
regulatory programs of other SROs).
70. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 3, and 5
Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and
8 Relating to the NYSE’s Business Combination With Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251–52 (Mar. 6, 2006).
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regional exchanges, meanwhile, could build systems that would bypass
exchange specialists or market makers, rather than rely upon their negative
obligation to refrain from trading in an otherwise liquid market.71
Fourth, a for-profit structure was more conducive to expansion in
the technology boom of the late 1990s. Raising capital as a non-profit
membership organization would entail higher regulatory or trading fees,
and thus would require membership and Commission scrutiny of each
initiative. By contrast, a public offering, followed by strategic acquisitions
for stock, allows SROs to expand operational capabilities rapidly by
purchasing boutique technology firms rather than develop proprietary
technologies.72 Nasdaq’s acquisition of Instinet and NYSE’s merger with
Archipelago—the two ECNs with the largest market share of National
Market System (NMS) order flow—could not have taken place without
access to capital markets.73 Publicly held stock may also facilitate mergers
with similarly structured international exchanges to the extent that crossborder trading or technological synergies exist.74
The potential adverse consequences of the for-profit transformation are
manifest. SROs may lose their focus on serving as regulators for the
securities industry and instead concentrate on maximizing shareholder
revenues.75 From an economic perspective, this is unobjectionable. There
are many regulated industries (e.g., the telecommunications industry) where
private companies operate public utilities and dictate (to a degree) the terms
of competition for their competitors. But in no sense of the word are such
71. The goal of the various “hybrid” market structures implemented in recent years by various
stock exchanges (including the NYSE and AMEX) is to augment opportunities for automated
execution of public orders at published quotations without eliminating the entry and execution of
floor-based orders. Specialists would continue, in such systems, to commit capital to bridge
temporary gaps in supply and demand—particularly for large transactions that may not be entirely
filled at the national best bid and offer—in exchange for preferential access to information,
exclusive interfaces with exchange systems for managing their trading interest, and the limited
ability to suspend automated executions or to conduct parallel floor auctions. See, e.g., Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendments to Establish the Hybrid Market, Exchange Act Release No.
53,539, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,353 (proposed Mar. 31, 2006) (approving NYSE’s proposed rule changes
to establish the hybrid market); Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change and Amendments, and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment, To Establish a New
Hybrid Trading System Known as AEMISM, Exchange Act Release No. 54,552, 71 Fed. Reg.
59,546 (Oct. 10, 2006) (approving AMEX’s proposed rule changes to establish the “Auction &
Electronic Market Integration” system).
72. Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,
Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 513 (2001).
73. Brian Blackstone, U.S. Approves Exchange Deals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2005, at C3
(describing Nasdaq’s acquisition of Instinet and NYSE’s merger with Archipelago).
74. See, e.g., Boston Options Exchange, http://www.bostonoptions.com/ove/ope.php (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006) (describing Boston Options Exchange Group LLC, a joint venture among
Montreal Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange and various member firms that manages all issues
relating to trading on the options exchange).
75. James D. Cox, Brands vs. Generics: Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 15, 19 (2000).
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specially licensed firms considered self-regulators representative of their
customers⎯at least no more than a taxicab medallion transforms a New
York cab driver into a traffic cop. Moreover, there is no consensus that
stock exchanges are essential utilities, the quotations of which must be
accessible by all broker-dealers, as long as common members are able to
limit significant price variations across markets.76
A second consequence of this transformation is the impact on public
perception of the fairness of the marketplace.77 One of the important
ceremonial duties of SROs is to take public remedial measures to address
misconduct by their members and listed issuers so that Congress and the
Commission do not have to resort to the more cumbersome combination of
legislation and regulation. When exchanges themselves become the source
of scandal, this function is lost. The scandal surrounding NYSE CEO
Richard Grasso’s compensation package, for example, while in theory
solely a concern of the members of the exchange (as a private company),
reflects the sense of civic responsibility to which SRO management is
(thought to be) held.78 This level of public accountability will no longer be
tenable when SRO shareholders require that their agents operate with the
morals of the marketplace.
D. CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES
The globalization imperative has permeated the financial services
sector. Shareholders of both the NYSE Group and Euronext, one of the
largest non-U.S. stock exchanges, have approved the merger of the two

76. Compare Junius Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 301 (2007) with Roger Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the
U.S. Securities Market, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273 (2007).
77. Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 657, 658 (2001) (discussing the reasons behind the historical organization of
certain financial services as mutual businesses).
78. See, e.g., The Post-Grasso Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at A1 (“While unproven,
the suggestion that the exchange’s boss was compensated generously to perpetuate an outdated
system that benefited insiders is potent because the institution is riddled with untenable conflicts
of interest. The exchange must be drastically overhauled if it is to regain investors’ trust.”); Jesse
Eisinger, The Well-Paid Regulator, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003, at C1 (“Whatever the NYSE
wants to pay its CEO is fine. But only if the NYSE is stripped of its regulatory authority. It’s
untenable for a regulator to simultaneously be running a business, especially one besieged by
superior competition. Investors need to trust that when those who run the markets throw out
pieties about disclosure and fairness, they are sincere. The way to restore investor trust is not for
Mr. Grasso to give back fractions of his wealth, but to give up a bit of his power.”). At the time,
the NYSE was a “Type A” not-for-profit corporation under section 402 of the N.Y. Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law. The NYSE Group, Inc. (the new holding company of the NYSE and its
affiliates) became a public corporation on March 8, 2006, following the completion of the merger
of the New York Stock Exchange into Archipelago Holdings, Inc. the prior day. See Steve Gelsi,
Moving the Market: NYSE Begins Its Life Today as a Listed Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2006, at
C5; Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, NYSE’s Trading Overload Draws Attention of the SEC,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2007, at C1.
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entities.79 Deutsche Börse and Borsa Italiana have also at various times
been in negotiations to join the NYSE-Euronext combination.80 Meanwhile,
Nasdaq has gradually increased its stake in the London Stock Exchange
even as its increasing hostile takeover offers have been rebuffed.81 More
modest initiatives have also taken place, such as the Boston Stock
Exchange’s joint venture with the Montreal Stock Exchange to develop a
common operating platform for options trading.82 And yet, to date, the
Commission has addressed only in the broadest terms how or on what terms
a non-U.S. stock exchange can maintain a presence in the United States
without running afoul of the statutory prohibition against trading by U.S.
brokers on unregistered exchanges.83
On the one hand, the Commission cannot deny the inevitable
conglomeration of national exchanges into transnational exchanges.84
Investors have reaped significant benefits from the consolidation of regional
exchanges in the United States and national exchanges in the EU in terms of
79. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The
Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007).
80. Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE Group’s Shareholders Approve Takeover of Euronext, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at C3.
81. Alistair MacDonald & Gren Manuel, Nasdaq Gets Tough in LSE Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec.
13, 2006, at C3 (describing Nasdaq’s hostile £2.7 billion bid to acquire a simple majority of LSE’s
shares); Britain Hopes to Limit Changes at Exchange, REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2006 (noting U.K.
officials’ concern that ownership of the LSE by Nasdaq could trigger the application of U.S. law).
See also Alistair MacDonald, With Nasdaq-LSE Deal Doubtful, Exchanges’ Next Steps are
Unclear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2007, at B3; Alistair MacDonald, LSE, Available Again, May Seek
New Partner—After Nasdaq Bows Out, Local Deals Could Prove Difficult to Put Together, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 2007, at C2.
82. See Boston Options Exchange, http://www.bostonoptions.com/ove/ope.php (last visited
Oct. 20, 2006).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000) (prohibiting any broker, dealer, or exchange from using any
facility of an exchange within or subject to U.S. jurisdiction unless such exchange is registered
under section 6 of the Exchange Act or exempted by the Commission upon application). Only one
non-U.S. exchange currently operates pursuant to a limited-volume exemption. See Order
Granting Limited Volume Exemption From Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the
Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 41,199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,953 (Mar 29, 1999);
Letter from Robert L. D. Colby, Deputy Director Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Steven
Lofchie, Partner, Davis, Polk & Wardwell (June 21, 2001) (commenting on an SEC no-action
position relating to Tradepoint Stock Exchange/virt-x exchange); Exchange Act Release No.
38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,486 (proposed June 4, 1997).
On March 1, 2007, Erik R. Sirri, Director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation,
revived discussion of proposals to exempt foreign exchanges from registration under section 6
subject to conditions established by rule. Erik R. Sirri, Dir., SEC Division of Market Regulation,
Trading Foreign Shares, Speech in Boston, Massachusetts (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030107ers.htm. See also Regulation of Exchanges,
Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,522–23 (Part VII.B.1) (June 4, 1997)
(soliciting comment on a proposal to rely on home-country regulation of non-U.S. securities
exchanges).
84. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at Harvard Business School Global Leadership
Forum, Ronald Reagan International Center: Cross-Border Exchange Mergers in the Context of
Global Trade (June 22, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch
062206cc.htm.
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access to trading opportunities, variety of listed securities, and
improvements in exchange technology and services.85 At present, crossborder synergies must come primarily from the latter, since the resulting
business combinations will operate largely as holding companies for
separately regulated and operated national exchanges.86 But cross-border
mergers would ultimately prove meaningless if U.S. institutional and retail
investors were unable to trade directly with European investors or if the
current restrictions on contact between non-U.S. brokers and exchanges
were to remain in place.
On the other hand, the Commission is reluctant to concede that U.S.
federal regulation or self-regulation stops at the U.S. border. U.S. disclosure
standards for exchange-listed companies would rapidly lose significance if
the SEC did not hold all companies listed on cross-border exchanges up to
the same standards as if they had a significant U.S. shareholder base. U.S.
investors would potentially be exposed to more manipulative or deceptive
conduct (as defined by the Commission) if foreign exchanges are subject to
laxer standards than U.S. markets. One might expect that international
efforts at harmonizing regulatory standards will pave the way for common
rules of market conduct,87 but the longstanding difficulties in reaching an
agreement on accounting standards suggests that such efforts will be
protracted.88
Exchanges face a dilemma of sorts as well. They could, consistent with
current regulations, attempt to rig cross-border trading and listing
mechanisms that provide some appearance of cross-border activity to U.S.
investors. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for example, the NYSE
had developed a special body of listing standards that it had aggressively
marketed to non-U.S. companies.89 Exchanges could quietly offer crossborder trading opportunities in non-U.S. securities through the facilities of
their members with U.S. affiliates, in the same manner as many electronic
85. Karmel, supra note 79, at 356–58.
86. See Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE-Euronext: One, but Two, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2006, at C4
(describing the holding company structure developed by NYSE Group and Euronext NV to avoid
U.S. regulation of European market operations and vice versa).
87. Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 130–31 (2005).
88. See SEC, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLESBASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 38 (Jul. 25, 2003) (describing efforts between the Financial
Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board to seek greater
convergence of U.S. and international accounting standards as “long-term”).
89. NYSE LCM § 103.00 (2006) (discussing the NYSE’s Alternate Listing Standards for
“foreign private issuers,” which among other things, apply quantitative standards regarding share
distribution based on global rather than U.S. share volume and limit interim financial disclosures
or corporate governance standards that may conflict with home country laws or practices); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at, 1830 (discussing the “inconsistent distinction” that U.S.
law makes between foreign and domestic issuers and its adverse impact on attempts by non-U.S.
exchanges to improve listing standards).
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trading systems operated by U.S. investment banks and brokerage firms
provided access to foreign markets.90 Foreign derivatives exchanges,
conversely, could to a limited extent familiarize U.S. investors and
intermediaries with their products even though they could not be “offered”
in the United States.91
A full-scale cross-border linkage, however, would either entail
enforcing U.S. regulation abroad (consistent with SRO’s gatekeeping
responsibilities), or require exchanges to shed their own SRO responsibilities (at least with respect to federal law).92 In other contexts, the lower
standard of gatekeeping responsibility has made it easier to permit such
cross-border access. In the U.S. commodity futures markets, where the
regulatory responsibilities of designated contract markets are more limited,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has permitted foreign
exchanges to offer electronic access to U.S. Future Commissions Merchants
(FCMs) through an informal regulatory process.93 In the EU, the Investment
Services Directive (soon to be replaced by the even more ambitious
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, or MiFID) has similarly
permitted investment firms in any EU member state to obtain remote access
to the regulated markets of any other EU member state based on a system of
coordinated home/host country regulation.94 Because listing and trading on
U.S. exchanges triggers the full application of U.S. federal securities law—
and requires U.S. exchanges to enforce that law as part of their statutory
mandate95—U.S. exchanges have struggled to keep up in the global mergers
race.

90. John Ramsay, Rule 15a-6 and the International Marketplace: Time for A New Idea?, 33
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 507, 517–22 (2002).
91. See, e.g., Eurex, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 662 (July 27, 2005);
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 359 (Mar. 6, 1996) (permitting non-U.S. exchanges to familiarize certain
registered broker-dealers and large financial institutions in the United States with certain of their
equity, index, and exchange-traded fund options).
92. Poser, supra note 72, at 534–35. At present, the only available option is for exchanges to
deregister and operate as “alternative trading systems” or brokerage firms. To do so, however,
would require that exchanges give up the authority to regulate their members’ business conduct
and discipline their members. See Regulation ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(2) (2005) (defining the
types of alternative trading system that may elect to register as a broker-dealer rather than as an
exchange).
93. The CFTC has recently reaffirmed that it will continue to grant no-action relief permitting
foreign commodity exchanges to provide direct access to their electronic trading systems to U.S.
firms and their associated persons. See Boards of Trade Located Outside of the United States and
No-Action Relief From the Requirement To Become a Designated Contract Market or Derivatives
Transaction Execution Facility, CFTC Policy Statement, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,443 (Nov. 2, 2006).
94. Council Directive 2004/39, arts. 33, 2004 O.J. (L145) 1, 26 (EC) (Apr. 21, 2004).
95. Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1) (2000); Exchange Act 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
78o-3(b)(2) (2000); Exchange Act § 19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (2000).
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III. SELF-IMPROVEMENT
Despite significant ambivalence about the future of self-regulation, the
reform proposals advanced by the industry and the Commission do not
break new ground.96 This is in part because the NASD and the Commission
have subtly transformed themselves to fill the gaps in traditional marketbased self-regulation. Given the Commission’s SRO governance initiatives
and the NASD’s own reputation of being too removed from its
membership’s interests, it is hard to see any benefit from completely
revamping the Exchange Act to eliminate or curtail self-regulation.97
Indeed, the presence of multiple SROs under one or more hybrid models
might well complement the Commission’s and the NASD’s authority by
providing a greater degree of responsiveness and representativeness to the
regulatory framework. The success of any such model would depend on an
appropriate allocation of responsibilities.
A. NO SRO?
Proposals for reforming regulation of the securities industry with a
dominant regulator not beholden to the industry would replace SROs with
direct Commission regulation or a new non-industry regulator along the
lines of the PCAOB. It is difficult to believe that direct Commission
regulation of registered broker-dealers alone could replace self-regulation.
It may appear inevitable that the Commission will continue to take steps in
this direction,98 given the international trend of replacing self-regulation of
individual markets with oversight by a single governmental or nongovernmental regulator.99 In addition to its traditional enforcement activities
96. For example, the Securities Industry Association’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Regulatory
Implications of Demutualization proposed five alternative models, including (1) multiple
exchanges with separate boards and information barriers, as is the case with the NASDR and
Nasdaq; (2) multiple SROs with firms designated to a single SRO for examination purposes; (3) a
hybrid model, in which member regulation is effected by a single SRO, and individual markets
regulate their own trading; (4) a single SRO for all purposes; and (5) SEC regulation. See SIA
White Paper, supra note 1, at 14. The Commission published a modified version of these
alternatives in its concept release on SRO governance. See Concept Release Concerning SelfRegulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700 (Nov. 18, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256 (Dec. 8,
2004).
97. Cf. Letter from Thomas W. Sexton, III, Vice President and General Counsel, Nat’l Futures
Ass’n, to Eileen Donovan, Acting Secretary, CFTC (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsComment.asp?ArticleID=1640 (“[A]pplaud[ing] the Commission’s decision not to include registered futures associations in the current proposed acceptable
practices for exchange governance and conflicts of interest.”).
98. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 775
(2006).
99. See id. at 833–34 (listing various nations that have opted to create “central agencies” for
the supervision of capital markets in emulation of the SEC). One frequently cited example is the
creation of the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA), which replaced or assumed the powers of
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under the antifraud laws, the Commission has established an Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) to administer a
“nationwide examination and inspection program for registered selfregulatory organizations, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing agencies,
investment companies, and investment advisers.”100 The Commission staff
also frequently consults with industry personnel about risk management
issues, in part under the aegis of its material associated persons reporting
requirements. The Commission’s unpleasant experience with the short-lived
SECO program, however, has discouraged it from arrogating an exclusive
role in the regulatory process.101 In addition to the significant financial cost
of maintaining the compliance and enforcement staff necessary to make
such regulation feasible, there is the added difficulty of adopting and
interpreting rules to govern industry conduct within the confines of the
Administrative Procedure Act.102
Moreover, if a new non-governmental regulator were employed, it is
hard to see how any such regulator would differ significantly from the
NASD, which has already emerged as the de facto exclusive regulator of

the individual U.K. self-regulatory bodies for financial services in 2000. The FSA describes itself
as:
[A]n independent non-governmental body, given statutory powers by the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000. We are a company limited by guarantee and financed
by the financial services industry. The Treasury appoints the FSA Board, which
currently consists of a Chairman, a Chief Executive Officer, three Managing Directors,
and 10 non-executive directors (including a lead non-executive member, the Deputy
Chairman). This Board sets our overall policy, but day-to-day decisions and
management of the staff are the responsibility of the Executive.
FSA, Who Are We, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last visited Jan.
29, 2006).
100. SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). In a recent report, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
has proposed that the “SEC should realign its organizational structure to improve its efficiency
and mirror the contours of the current capital markets, including, for example, by folding [OCIE]
back into the operating divisions to facilitate consistent interpretations of applicable rules.”
COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/
0703capmarketscomm.
101. Proposed Rule Change National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Conversion of
SECO Broker/Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 20,273, 1983 SEC LEXIS 569 (Oct. 12, 1983)
(converting SECO broker-dealers into NASD members).
102. For example, while OCIE routinely examines registered broker-dealers for compliance
with the requirement to obtain best execution for customer transactions, the Commission has
never adopted a best execution rule, preferring instead to rely upon SRO rulemaking and
enforcement actions. See, e.g., OCIE, Examinations of Broker-Dealers Offering Online Trading:
Summary of Findings and Recommendations (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/online.htm (discussing OCIE staff reviews of best-execution practices at on-line
brokerage firms).
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brokerage firms for most aspects of broker-dealer business conduct.103 The
allure of a universal non-industry regulator would appear to be twofold: its
members would be appointed by the Commission, and it would derive its
funding from a statutory levy on broker-dealers, rather than membership
dues and service fees.104 Putting aside concerns about the constitutionality
of such a structure,105 legislatively chartered self-regulatory organizations
such as the MSRB as well as quasi-SRO membership organizations such as
SIPC have long successfully combined executive/Commission appointments and industry representation.106 Preserving a general statute of SRO
registration, rather than chartering individual SROs by legislation, may also
facilitate the formation, consolidation, and dissolution of specialty SROs
without the need for Congressional intervention.

103. Within days of this Symposium, the NASD and the NYSE announced the signing of a
“letter of intent” to merge their oversight functions into a new self-regulatory organization. See
Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE, NASD Link Regulatory Arms, WALL ST. J., at C4 (Nov. 28, 2006). As
part of the merger, NYSE Regulation announced that “approximately 470” staff members in its
regulation, arbitration, risk assessment and related enforcement units would join the new SRO.
See News Release, NYSE Regulation Consolidation Plan by Richard G. Ketchum, Chief
Executive Officer, NYSE Regulation, Inc. (Nov. 28, 2006) available at http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/content/articles/1164712197534.html.
104. At present, SROs cover the costs of self-regulation through regulatory fees assessed on
members, listing fees assessed on issuers, market data fees assessed on the sale of quotation and
transaction information to the public, and transaction fees assessed on transactions executed
through their facilities. To ensure adequate funding for SRO services, SROs have, inter alia,
been given the right to sell consolidated quotation and a privilege to sell transaction information
collected
from
their
members
under
national
market
system
plans.
See
Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.601–243.602 (2000). As described above, however, proposed
Commission rules would specifically prohibit the use of regulatory fees, fines, and penalties to
fund operational activities. See supra p. 332; see also supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
105. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1029–60 (2005). See Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, 2007 WL 891675 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (granting summary judgment to PCAOB on
question of its constitutionality under “separation-of-powers principles,” the Appointments
Clause, and the “non-delegation doctrine”).
106. The MSRB is a board composed of fifteen members that has the powers and duties of a
self-regulatory organization under the Exchange Act and whose rules are enforceable against
any broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (including the municipal securities division of a
bank) that effects transactions in municipal securities. See Exchange Act § 15B(b), (c)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b), (c)(1) (Supp. II 2002); Exchange Act § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26)
(2000) (defining “self-regulatory organization”). SIPC, while not a “self-regulatory organization”
under the Exchange Act, is a nonprofit membership organization “the members of which shall be
all persons registered as brokers or dealers under section . . . 78o(b) of the 1934 Act” (with
exceptions) and whose by-laws and rule changes are generally subject to Commission approval.
15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A), (e) (2000) The MSRB’s board is composed of fifteen members
appointed by the Commission, five of whom are representatives of the broker-dealer industry and
five of whom are representatives of the banking industry. Exchange Act § 15B(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-4(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002). SIPC’s board is composed of seven persons, five of whom
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (three of whom are
“associated with, and representative of different aspects of, the securities industry”) and two of
whom are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively.
15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(c)(2).
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While it is in the Commission’s interest to reduce the reliance upon
cross-subsidization of SRO regulatory activities, the necessity of formally
removing this authority from the regulatory body—by establishing statutory
assessments or levies on members or market participants—is unclear. To a
degree, the regulatory monopoly on other revenue sources has distorted the
efficiency of market operations because the Commission has never sought
to ensure that SROs will dedicate those funds for regulatory purposes rather
than operational objectives.107 Disentangling SRO services from SRO
funding and requiring a separate source of funding for member regulation
would improve SRO accounting and accountability. But this is unrelated to
whether SROs are able to set appropriate fees for the regulation of their
members. It may be far more efficient to eliminate cross-subsidies for
regulation and allow SROs to set membership fees, than to mandate
member assessments or a statutory levy.
B. IS THERE A NEED FOR “MARKET BASED” SELF-REGULATION?
If some consolidation of member supervision is desirable, should other
self-regulatory responsibilities also be consolidated? “Market based” selfregulation may be justified by a desire on the part of the Commission and
individual exchanges to retain flexibility in governing the obligations of
market makers and specialists and to facilitate variety in trading rules while
ensuring compatibility with intermarket systems.108 For example, the
Commission has expressed concern that since trading rules currently
governing the conduct of market makers and specialists differ to a sufficient
degree from exchange to exchange that it might be difficult to implement a
single SRO model.109 In practice, such trading rules may not need to be
subject to Commission approval if the Commission were to use its authority
to define what the affirmative and negative obligations (if any) of market
makers and specialists should be.110 Given the difficulty of drafting such
rules, the Commission has preferred to exercise the right to disapprove of
individual rule changes.

107. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on
Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW 637, 659–61
(2002).
108. See, e.g., SIA White Paper, supra note 1, at pt. III.E.3 (“[A disadvantage of a single SRO
model is that under] “under the current regulatory system . . . , the technical details of trading
regulation remain with the entities actually engaged in the trading activity. By removing the
trading regulation to a remote entity, the synergy between the trading systems and the regulation is
lost. For example, as exchanges and other market participants innovate, their systems would not
be as well designed for easy surveillance because regulators could no longer shape development
of the technology. The coordinated and concurrent innovation of the trading systems and their
corresponding surveillance programs is forfeited.”).
109. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,256, 71,280 (Dec. 8, 2004).
110. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (2006); Simon & Trkla, supra note 15, at 346–47.
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The Commission’s wariness is not altogether unreasonable, given that
different products will require different levels of intermediation as
circumstances change. For example, the Commission has observed that
options exchanges may require different trading rules than stock exchanges
because of the greater need for market intermediaries and membergenerated quotations in less liquid options markets.111 But this is equally
true for other products which do not necessarily trade on exchanges. As
discussed below, it may be preferable to develop uniform criteria for
intermediation by product, rather than through a system in which the
Commission haggles with individual SROs over rule changes in an attempt
to ensure no one exchange has an advantage over the others.112 Individual
markets may then seek no-action or exemptive relief if their proposed
trading rules come into conflict with Commission or SRO rules, much as
other securities intermediaries do today.
Second, uniformity in market structure does not necessarily require
exchange-based self-regulation. If a central limit order book or display
facility for all securities were envisioned, it would make sense for a single
utility or regulator to take charge of the operation of that system (whether it
be the NASD or a separately constituted SRO for that purpose). Likewise, if
the Commission were ultimately to determine that competitive forces
should guide the centralization of order flow, the role of a market utility
SRO would consist exclusively of collecting and displaying market
information (much like the NASD’s Alternative Display Facility or SIAC’s
CQ and CT Services). In such a world, exchange markets would essentially
be first among equals, but would not enjoy special privileges (or incur
special obligations) as a result of their primacy in the marketplace.
The Commission’s pursuit of an intermediate market structure—
involving automated execution of public orders across markets through
intermarket linkages113—creates the need for a series of hubs through which
orders may be publicly displayed and accessed by other market centers and
broker-dealers. Regulation of SRO “market” rules provides a convenient
way for the Commission to ensure enhanced oversight over the critical
joints in the marketplace while continuing to espouse a policy of competing
trading venues with hardwired linkages. But other regulatory categories
111. Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 49,175, 69
Fed. Reg. 6124, 6128–30 (Feb. 9, 2004) (describing institutionalized payment for order flow
arrangements, specialist guarantees, and internalization on options markets).
112. For example, if certain thresholds of payment for order flow or internalization are tolerated
on options exchanges as a means of encouraging market maker participation, such standards could
be developed by an options SRO, independent of any single options market, and applied across the
board to all options exchanges. See id. at 6130–31 (discussing concerns with exchange payments
for order flow, specialist guarantees, and internalization on options exchanges and the options
exchanges’ conflicts of interest).
113. Of course, that is the Commission’s mandate under section 11A of the Exchange Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(d) (2000).
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exist—such as the securities information processor (SIP)—which could
perform the same function (with some legislative modification). A network
of registered SIPs, like telecommunications providers or public utilities,
could be regulated as essential facilities of the marketplace—subject to fair
access requirements and reasonable rates—without the need for the full
complement of SRO rules.114 More importantly, such franchises could be
awarded on the basis of the superiority of their connectivity, rather than be
awarded by default to legacy exchanges who have had significant incentives
to diminish interaction of their captive order flow with the rest of the
market.
C. SEPARATION OF PROMULGATION, COMPLIANCE, AND
ENFORCEMENT
Another frequently mentioned approach to reforming self-regulation is
to separate SRO functions by process, rather than subject matter. The
Exchange Act currently exposes SROs to disciplinary sanction if they fail to
enforce the rules they promulgate.115 Some commentators have suggested
that the task of promulgating rules need not be performed by the same
entity that is responsible for ensuring compliance with or prosecuting
violations of those rules.116 Thus, one could employ a universal regulator
for compliance inspections and enforcement of the rules of several different
SROs. In other situations, SRO standard setting—without any formal
compliance or enforcement process—might permit a degree of regulatory
supervision over activities that would not be feasible if the SRO were
compelled by the Exchange Act to enforce such rules through formal
disciplinary action.
This model is in use today in areas where the Commission’s
jurisdictional authority brushes against other domestic regulatory
authorities. For example, in the government and municipal securities
markets, where both banks and broker-dealers are able to act as government
or municipal securities brokers and dealers, rulemaking authority is given to
one body (the MSRB and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively), while
compliance and enforcement activities are undertaken by an “appropriate
regulatory authority.”117 Regional exchanges have outsourced many of their
compliance and enforcement functions to the NASD,118 while the SEC has
114. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in Regulating
Information, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2007).
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (2000).
116. Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-Regulation as We
Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2005).
117. The Exchange Act defines the “appropriate regulatory authority” for these purposes as the
Commission for registered broker-dealers and the relevant federal or state bank regulator for
banks and departments or divisions thereof. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34) (Supp. IV 2004).
118. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78q(d) (LexisNexis 2006), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.17d-2 (2007)
promulgated thereunder. See also Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62
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long required the selection of an exclusive “designated examining
authority” for monitoring compliance with financial responsibility rules.119
The SEC and Department of Justice are responsible for civil and criminal
enforcement actions, respectively, under the federal securities laws.120 The
CFTC and SEC jointly promulgate rules for security futures products and
security futures exchanges, while each separately undertakes disciplinary
and enforcement action with respect to registered FCMs and broker-dealers
respectively.
There are clear advantages to such a model. Industry participants in
SRO governance are best positioned to identify emerging practices that
require greater regulatory scrutiny and to define appropriate norms of
business conduct. They may, however, be more reluctant to explore new
theories of liability if there is a possibility that their own firms may have
engaged in similar conduct. To the extent that securities markets become
increasingly specialized, it may be desirable to have SROs composed of
representative industry members dedicated to rulemaking for particular
products or market sectors, as discussed in Part IV, infra.121 Subject to the
SEC’s oversight and coordination, a universal compliance and enforcement
SRO could make it easier for industry leaders to participate more
effectively in the articulation of “just and equitable principles of trade”
without the duplication of enforcement personnel.
For instruments that are not directly subject to regulation by financial
regulators, industry SROs may provide some market discipline for
intermediaries even in the absence of a formal compliance or enforcement
regime. There may be areas where SROs might be more willing to
undertake information-gathering initiatives—such as centralized monitoring
of credit exposure—if the information gathered thereby will not be used for
enforcement purposes other than determining eligibility for continued SRO
membership or initiating internal disciplinary proceedings. Many such
functions are performed under the aegis of trade associations today, but an
Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,159 (June 4, 1997) (listing the existing agreements under Exchange Act Rule
17d-2 between various exchanges, the NYSE and the NASD).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(d)(1), (k)(5) (Supp. IV 2004) (“[T]he term ‘examining authority’
means a self-regulatory organization registered with the Commission under this title (other than a
registered clearing agency) with the authority to examine, inspect, and otherwise oversee the
activities of a registered broker or dealer.”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 400.3 (2006) (“Designated
examining authority and Examining Authority mean (1) in the case of a registered government
securities broker or dealer that belongs to only one self-regulatory organization, such selfregulatory organization, and (2) in the case of a registered government securities broker or dealer
that belongs to more than one self-regulatory organization, the self-regulatory organization
designated by the Commission pursuant to section 17(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 78q(d)) as the
entity with responsibility for examining such registered government securities broker or dealer.”).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. II 2002) (providing the SEC the authority to investigate and
bring civil enforcement actions); id. § 78ff (Supp. II 2002) (providing criminal penalties for
willful violations).
121. Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory Self
Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1115, 1125 (2005).
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“SRO-lite” regime would provide a modicum of public accountability and
SEC involvement.
This model also has the potential to simplify cross-border regulation.
SROs might, for example, adopt rules governing the conduct of their U.S.
and non-U.S. members, which could be enforced under each country’s
securities or commercial law regime. For example, the Commission and the
NASD could serve as the enforcement authorities for such SRO rules in the
United States, while other jurisdictions might elect to provide for the
enforcement of SRO rules through disciplinary action by a regulated market
or government regulator, private rights of action under contract or
commercial fraud regimes, or some other industry sanction. Current
memoranda of understanding among securities regulators could be
amplified, as cross-border activities expand, to facilitate parallel
enforcement and, where necessary, negotiate the minimum level of
protection U.S. and non-U.S. regulators might require for any selfregulatory regime. The Commission could thus maintain the view that such
markets are governed by uniform rules, although the details of inspections
and enforcement would vary by jurisdiction.
The risks of this model are evident. Any separation of rulemaking and
enforcement powers would raise concerns about inconsistent interpretation,
underallocation or overallocation of enforcement resources to particular
rules, and the resolution of redundancies across multiple SROs.122 The
Commission (in coordination with foreign regulatory or self-regulatory
authorities) would have to exert significant authority both upon the
approval of promulgated rules and in the course of its oversight of SRO
disciplinary and enforcement actions to ensure that consistency is
maintained. The Commission would also have to orchestrate the allocation
of responsibilities among substantive rule promulgators to avoid gaps and
conflicts. For example, different products may entail different rules
governing advertising, capital and margin requirements, execution
standards, and clearance and settlement mechanisms. Ensuring that such
rules operate as interoperable modules in the face of latent conflicts or
conflicting interpretive guidance would require the Commission to use its
authority to modify or amend SRO rules more aggressively than it has in
the past.
IV. SELF-ACTUALIZATION
There are many directions that the self-regulatory structure of the
marketplace could take, depending largely on whether the securities

122. One possibility is to take advantage of the Exchange Act’s existing if neglected concept
of “affiliated securities associations,” which might seek to register for the purpose of
drafting specialized rules for enforcement by the NASD or other registered affiliate. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(c), (d) (2000).
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industry prefers predictability and certainty to autonomy and accountability.
If the fundamental concept of self-regulation remains valid, the task is to
define those circumstances in which the industry’s efforts may be deployed
to serve the shared collective interest in minimum standards of conduct,
while centralizing or even federalizing other areas where greater conflicts
with the public interest are perceived to arise.
A. SRO V. NON-SRO ACTIVITIES
As discussed in Part I, supra, self-regulation stands the best chance of
succeeding when the SRO is responsible for enforcing mutual or reciprocal
norms of conduct which require industry expertise to administer. Thus,
execution protocols, clearance and settlement functions, risk management,
and sales and marketing practices for emerging products are all likely to
remain within SRO control. By contrast, there are several aspects of the
current self-regulatory system, where as a result of Congressional or
Commission action, the potential for an effective self-regulatory role has
gradually disappeared. In these cases, one can envision replacing SRO
regulation with a combination of Commission regulation and a universal
NASD-like regulator or a licensed technology provider.
A national market system mechanism for disseminating quotation and
transaction information mandated by the Commission could be centralized
and operated independently of existing SROs.123 While individual markets
remain free to choose the types of information they would like to disclose
and on what terms, the Commission has preempted the role of selfregulation by dictating the minimum information that must be disclosed: by
all market centers through intermarket mechanisms: SROs exercise at best
residual authority to implement the technical requirements of those
mandates—for example, distinguishing reportable trades from nonreportable ones, specifying the information to be provided and the
timeframes within which they must be reported. These functions, however,
could best be performed by the Commission or single regulator, or by a
national market system plan with broad industry representation.124
Alternatively, rules could be established by individual product regulators
for the industry, but actual systems would be maintained (and revenues
would be collected and distributed) by an independent service provider.
Corporate governance standards are another area where the mandate for
centralization under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increasingly makes SRO
regulation an artifact. Congress and the Commission have increasingly
resorted to codifying the costs and benefits of exchange listing—e.g.,

123. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069,
1146 (2006).
124. Id.
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exemption from blue-sky rules125 in exchange for heightened corporate
governance standards.126 Exchanges, meanwhile, have shown increasingly
less stomach for enforcing rules that threaten to erode the number of new
and existing listed companies.127 Codifying higher corporate governance
standards for companies that trade in highly liquid markets can take place in
other fora—such as an NMS plan or as a condition of becoming a publicly
quoted company. Markets again would remain free to set their own
additional standards, but would be relieved of their historical gatekeeping
function.
More generally, an attitudinal shift should take place in which an
SRO’s enforcement obligations do not include policies and procedures to
monitor for compliance with and enforce Commission rulemaking. SROs
are more than capable of undertaking a cost/benefit assessment with respect
to the enforcement of their rules, but have no real discretion with respect to
their statutory obligation to enforce federal law. This creates an exceptional
hurdle for any new SRO that seeks to register as an exchange or national
securities association, while imposing little, if any, real sanctions on
existing SROs that fail to live up to that responsibility. If any of the hybrid
models is adopted, a single self-regulator such as the NASD could be made
responsible for this statutory mandate, while allowing other SROs the
freedom to devote limited resources to achieve more modest regulatory
goals.
B. MULTIPLE REGULATORS
As suggested above, if a single regulator system is adopted, other SROs
could play an important, if peripheral, role in setting standards for industry
conduct. Many complaints are raised about the monolithic nature of SRO
rulemaking, whether it be domination of self-regulatory bodies by major
investment firms, the imposition of uniform rules on dissimilar products, or
structural differences in business practices. A system of multiple SROs with
clear mandates, minimal overlap, and sufficient members to demonstrate
credibility and minimize abuse may assuage some of these concerns.
One possible demarcation would be based on size and geographic
scope. The Maloney Act contemplated the registration of multiple national
securities associations, as long as “the number and geographical distribution
of its members and the scope of their transactions” was sufficient to enable
each such association to carry out the purposes of the Act.128 A case could
be made that smaller or regional brokerage firms might prefer a degree of
autonomy to define their own business practices, or at least to distance

125.
126.
127.
128.

15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)–(b) (2000).
See id. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. II 2002).
See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(1) (2000).
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themselves from the bulge bracket firms that are perceived to exercise
inordinate influence over the NASD and NYSE. Such arrangements could
also facilitate the de-registration of regional exchanges by allowing their
members to reorganize as a looser regional securities association with a
more limited set of rules enforced by the NASD.
In principle, such associations should not be objectionable since the
informal segregation of bulge bracket and smaller brokerage firms exists
today to a certain degree. The roster of NYSE member organizations
includes nearly all of the bulge bracket investment banks headquartered in
New York City.129 As a result, these firms are subject to NYSE rules (as
well as NASD rules, if they are engaged in public business) and NYSE
enforcement, while the nation’s remaining broker-dealers are subject to
NASD rules (as well as regional exchange rules) and NASD
enforcement.130 Federal financial responsibility rules also provide special
provisions for computing the net capital and customer reserve requirements
of the largest investment banks.
The question remains, of course, whether regional associations would
promote better business practices, or simply create opportunities to dilute
existing principles of trade. A strong case would need to be made that the
rules of any regional securities association that differ from NASD business
conduct rules are necessary or desirable for the particular region or class of
brokers or otherwise outweigh the benefits obtained through standardization
of NASD compliance and enforcement practices. To the extent, however,
that the NASD’s regional district personnel have developed unique
practices or procedures, the codification of such practices or procedures in
regional SRO rules may have some benefit.
A second possible categorization of special purpose SROs might turn
on the business model of their members. Today, for example, carrying
brokers responsible for handling customer funds and securities and
collecting margins for leveraged accounts are generally regulated under
NYSE and DTCC or OCC rules. While, one could envision SROs that
develop specialized rules for electronic trading systems, market makers and
specialists, and other standard business models in the broker-dealer
community, the formation of such SROs is unlikely for a number of
reasons. First, the rapid consolidation of firms that perform similar
activities may undermine the fundamental criterion that an SRO possess the
necessary diversity of membership to avoid domination by a handful of
129. As of this writing, the NYSE’s member firm directory includes approximately
206 companies that conduct business with the public. See News Release, New York Stock Exch.,
NYSE Firms Report Third-Quarter 2006 Results (Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1165317470489.html.
130. Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (June 4, 1997) (describing the
existing agreements under Exchange Act Rule 17d-2 between various exchanges, the NYSE and
the NASD).
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powerful interests. Second, to the extent that markets must be designed to
facilitate the interaction of different business models (e.g., specialists and
public brokers), allowing each to define the parameters of their business
conduct without the participation of the other would create opportunities for
overreaching or abuse. Third, the integration of different business models
with individual firms could enhance the potential for redundant rules.
The most compelling case for the creation of limited purpose SROs is
product regulation. As discussed above, special SROs have been created
for the regulation of various products that may be traded both by brokerdealers and by other financial intermediaries. Thus, the MSRB regulates
banks and broker-dealers trading municipal debt, and security futures
exchanges jointly regulated by the SEC and CFTC regulate broker-dealers
and futures commission merchants that trade security futures products.
Within the securities markets, separate SROs exist that focus on the
regulation of options markets (e.g., CBOE) and options transactions (e.g.,
OCC), equity markets and equity transactions (e.g., DTCC), and other
products.131
Products that might benefit from special purpose SROs are corporate
debt and exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives. While exchanges historically traded government and corporate bonds as well as listed
stocks, the migration of debt trading into institutional over-the-counter
markets has had both benefits and disadvantages. Debt securities had
largely escaped national market system regulation until the late 1990s
because such rules were predicated upon the ability to build upon existing
quotation and execution mechanisms of stock exchanges. The Commission
prodded the NASD to build display and execution mechanisms for listed
and unlisted equity securities in the over-the-counter market, but these
mechanisms could not be easily grafted to the even more decentralized
world of debt. Only recently, with the increasing automation of the debt
market, has the NASD undertaken to extend such mechanisms to debt
securities.
On the other hand, the extension of regulatory approaches devised for
equity securities to debt securities without the opportunity for the industry
to develop alternative approaches can have unfavorable consequences.132
The obligation to obtain the best execution of a debt transaction reasonable
under the circumstances poses particular difficulties in debt markets, where
131. The Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, a subsidiary of the Depositary Trust & Clearing
Corporation, performs post-trade comparison, netting and settlement of government and
mortgage-backed securities transactions. Each division offers “product-specific services” to its
members—such as pool notification for mortgage-backed securities transactions—and maintains
separate rules and a separate collateral margin pool. See The Fixed Income Clearing Corporation,
http://www.ficc.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
132. Letter from Marjorie Gross, Bond Market Association, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Mar.
8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s74004/mgross030805.pdf (commenting
on SRO Concept Release and advocating a “debt market SRO” along the lines of the MSRB).
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dealer quotations are not centralized.133 Transaction reporting protocols for
debt securities underwent several rounds of modification and remains
subject to criticism because of the greater volatility of debt prices resulting
from the relative illiquidity and size of debt transactions.134 As the
retailization of corporate debt continues, however, the Commission and
self-regulators are likely to face even greater pressure to adopt rules
governing corporate debt transactions. As with the MSRB, a specialty
regulator for corporate debt—or an SRO dedicated to drafting specific rules
governing all debt transactions—might be the optimal approach.
Exchange-traded options and derivatives also operate pursuant to
unique rules driven by the nature of options markets that may merit a single
derivatives market self-regulator. As discussed above, special trading rules
have been developed by options exchanges to induce greater participation
by market making and order routing intermediaries on options exchanges.135
Portfolio margining systems for options and derivatives transactions in U.S.
securities markets have not developed as quickly as in U.S. futures markets
in part because of the need for multiple options and non-options SROs to
amend their rules in concert.136 Options firms have also had difficulty in
“regularly and rigorously” reviewing their order routing practices in part
because of the lack of uniformity in current execution quality reporting
practices by options exchanges.137
Over-the-counter derivatives present an even more compelling case for
a self-regulatory scheme because such products are subject to minimal
regulation by federal financial regulators. The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 has exempted “swap agreements” among
“eligible contract participants” from off-board trading restrictions on
financial futures and most federal securities regulation (other than certain
133. Changes to NASD’s Best Execution Rule Okayed by SEC Over BMA, Others’ Concerns, 38
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1504 (Aug. 30, 2006).
134. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1 Thereto Relating to the Dissemination of TRACE
Trade Information, Exchange Act Release No. 53,031, 71 Fed. Reg. 634 (Jan. 5, 2006)
(recounting history of TRACE facility for reporting of corporate debt transactions).
135. See Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 49,175,
69 Fed. Reg. 6124 (Feb. 9, 2004).
136. See e.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Customer Portfolio
Margining Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 53,576, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,519, 17,527 (Apr. 6,
2006) and Exchange Act Release No. 53,577, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,539, 17,547 (Apr. 6, 2006) (filing
of proposed rule changes by the NYSE and the CBOE relating to portfolio margining, both noting
the role of the NYSE’s Rule 431 Committee—composed of several member organizations and
several SROs including the NYSE, CBOE, and NASD as well as representatives from the SIA Ad
Hoc Committee on Portfolio Margining—in making recommendations for portfolio margining).
137. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC, REPORT CONCERNING
EXAMINATIONS OF OPTIONS ORDER ROUTING AND EXECUTION 10 (Mar. 8, 2007) (“The Staff
also found that because standardized execution quality statistics are not provided by each of the
options exchanges, most firms analyze only the execution quality provided to their own customer
orders. The lack of standardized, widely available execution quality data may affect thorough best
execution reviews by firms.”).
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antifraud rules for equity-based swaps).138 While such exemptions may be
appropriate in light of the wide range of financial institutions that trade such
products and their relative sophistication, there is no recognized public
forum in which industry members may seek to self-regulate. Standard
agreements developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association and voluntary disclosure efforts encouraged by the Federal
Reserve Board and others to control counterparty credit exposure provide
some mutual self-regulation,139 but only modest effort has been undertaken
to develop business conduct standards or other forms of reciprocal selfregulation despite frequently recited concerns about the leverage of hedge
funds, institutional investors, and other swap counterparties and the lack of
infrastructure in the swaps marketplace.140
The advantage of a self-regulatory scheme over informal industry
coordination is the antitrust immunity conferred by the SRO structure. As
with the original arrangements that led to the creation of the NASD under
the Maloney Act, banks and broker-dealers that act as swap intermediaries
could agree to transact on more favorable terms with one another than with
non-SRO members as a means of encouraging compliance with industry
norms. Such arrangements could include the participation in black-box or
other mechanisms that monitor direct and indirect counterparty credit
exposure as a supplement to bilateral risk management measures. Swap
intermediaries that failed to adhere to such standards would not be subject
to civil or criminal enforcement, but rather the traditional SRO sanction:
paying higher fees to lay off positions with member intermediaries.
C. BETTER ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
Congress and the Commission may also wish to consider whether
concurrent public or private enforcement of SRO rules would improve the
self-regulatory model, particularly if self-regulatory concepts are to be
leveraged to international linkages. The conceptual core of SRO regulation
is standard-setting. Delegating compliance and enforcement functions to
SROs has some theoretical basis—to the extent that industry members have

138. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) (2006). The Commodity Exchange Act’s off-board trading prohibition
does not apply to or govern, among other transactions, any non-agricultural commodity
transaction between certain “eligible contract participants” that is subject to individual negotiation
by the parties and is not executed or traded on a trading facility.
139. See, e.g., COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER
FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 11 (July 27, 2005) (presenting
recommendations and guiding principles, classified as (i) “actions that individual institutions can
and should take at their own initiative,” (ii) “actions which can be taken only by institutions
collectively in collaboration with industry trade groups,” and (iii) “actions which require
complementary and/or cooperative actions by the official sector”).
140. Lawmakers Seek GAO Report on Tech Woes in Derivatives Market, 38 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1008 (June 9, 2006) (requesting that GAO determine the adequacy of the
legal, technological and paperwork handling infrastructure of credit derivatives markets).
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a mutual or reciprocal interest in the regulation of their competitors—but
has largely been viewed as a means of avoiding the direct financial and
political costs to the SEC of policing the securities industry’s business
conduct. At the same time, given the significant skepticism about the
efficiency of private litigation, it is unlikely that private rights of action for
infringement of SRO rules would be viewed as a favorable option.
One approach would be to undertake concurrent public enforcement
action against firms that willfully violate SRO rules, either through a
pattern of misconduct or egregious violations. The unrestricted scope of
Rule 10b-5 and varying standards of scienter makes it an undesirable tool
for regulation of securities intermediaries, but a more focused Commission
rule that targets abusive business conduct defined by a registered standardsetter presents a more compelling case for Commission action. A new
Commission rule to supplant Rule 10b-5 enforcement actions would also
create a fresh opportunity to deter the implication of private rights of action.
SROs may also wish to consider whether there are market-oriented
approaches to enforcing SRO rules. Greater disclosure in confirmation
statements regarding execution quality—such as presenting contemporaneous price quotations, realized spreads, or other information—would
create a powerful disincentive to violate best execution rules, even if private
enforcement action against questionable transactions is generally prohibited
for conduct short of fraud.
V. CONCLUSION
The irony should not be lost that the Commission is considering
whether to write exchanges out of the Exchange Act: It suggests that in
harnessing the power of exchanges for the benefit of investors, we have
extinguished their innate incentives to bring order to the securities markets.
The concept of self-regulation, however, has permeated so many
operational aspects of the securities industry that it would be very difficult
to eliminate it entirely from the federal regulatory framework. Investors
have benefited from the continuing dialogue between the Commission and
self-regulatory bodies as listings have multiplied, securities grown more
complex, and market structures evolved in various product areas. A
product-oriented system of self-regulation, with consolidated NASD
enforcement, might serve as a worthy heir to the legacy of self-regulatory
exchanges.

